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The scandal Gilles Personne de Roberval precipitated in December 1658 in the Montmor academy in Paris, one of the earliest philosophical gatherings, exemplifies some of these tensions. According to the savant and astronomer Ismael Boulliau, M. de Roberval ... has done a very stupid thing in the house of M. de Montmor who is as you know a man of honor and position; he was so uncivil as to say to him in his own house, having taken offense at an opinion of M. des Cartes which M. de Montmor approved, that he had more wit than he, and that he was less only in worldly goods and the office of Maitre des Requetes, and that if he were Maitre des Requetes he would be worth a hundred times more. Monsieur de Montmor, who is very circumspect, said to him that he could and should behave more civilly than to quarrel with him and treat him with contempt in his own house. The whole company found the boorishness and pedantry of M. de Roberval very strange.14 Although Roberval never participated in that gathering again, the company was slow to recover from the shock and, marred by continuing disagreements, eventually closed down in 1664 (see SO 16. For instance, in 1611, Galileo's patron, Cosimo II de' Medici, reprimanded him for his conduct in the dispute on buoyancy even though, by that time, the exchange had been taking place outside of the court and not in the presence of the Grand Duke. That his mathematician and philosopher had engaged in public verbal disputations seemed inappropriate to Cosimo, who wanted Galileo to express his ideas in print, which, eventually, Galileo did. See Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier, pp. 178-80.
Grand Duke Ferdinand II de' Medici, who feared "diplomatic incidents" between him and the princely patrons of his savants' opponents.17 For similar reasons, princes and high-status patrons tended to act as arbiters rather than judges and generally assumed a "nominalist" attitude about the claims being debated. 18 For instance, when Leopold de' Medici, the founder of the Accademia del Cimento, became unwillingly involved in the debate between Christiaan Huygens and Honore Fabri on Saturn's rings in 1660, he delayed acknowledging Huygens's dedication of his 1659 Systema Saturnium for more than a year, told him that he was not a "judge apt to issue pronouncements over his doctrines," and eventually passed the matter on to his academicians."9 Responding to Leopold's concerns, the academicians constructed mechanical models after the two competing hypotheses and, without passing final judgment, reported what their findings (about the models, not Saturn itself) suggested about the tenability of the contenders' claims.20 The reports were never published.2' Practitioners did not always share the cautious civility and "nominalist" attitudes of patrons and princes. Although Roberval's daring impoliteness seems to have been unique, elements of his ethos were not alien to Galileo, Newton, Edme Mariotte, and Robert Hooke, who often sought to increase their professional distinction by emphasizing the epistemological status or priority of their claims and who could be impolite in criticizing their opponents. Tensions around property and propriety were not limited to patron-client interactions but also emerged in debates between practitioners belonging to different social groups and moral economies. In the dispute between Huygens and Hooke on the spring watch in 1675, Huygens (a patrician) followed the protocols of gentlemanly politeness espoused by the Royal Society, assuming that Hooke would do the same.22 But Hooke-who abided by an artisanal rather than Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century gentlemanly moral economy-did not share Huygens's manners, insulted him, and precipitated a crisis that forced the Society to reconsider its ability to provide a forum for the polite negotiation of disputes. 23 Although conflicts between different moral economies and notions of civility were widespread throughout society, they were more serious among natural philosophers, as received notions of truth provided only a very limited leeway to negotiate those tensions. Writing from Paris in February 1658, Boulliau contrasted the styles of the scientific academy that met at the house of Monsieur de Montmor with a literary gathering assembled by the Venetian ambassador:
From certain persons I have learned that the Venetians are more agreeable, more polite, more urbane, and use complimentary words in discussion. The Montmorians are sharper, and dispute with vehemence, since they quarrel about the pursuit of truth; sometimes they are eager to rail at each other, and jealously deny a truth, since each one, although professing to inquire and investigate, would like to be the sole author of the truth when discovered. And if anyone in the course of his hunting find that truth, the others will not in the end share in the spoils of their own free will and pleasure, because each one considers that his own fame and glory has lost something if he grant even a blade of grass to the victor and acknowledge him as the real discoverer. 24. I believe that what Boulliau says about discovery may be applicable to invention as well. Priority disputes about inventions (such as that between Huygens and Hooke on the spring watch) could be quite bitter not only because of the financial rewards one could derive from patents or privileges but because both contenders assumed that they were dealing with precisely the same device. By assuming an "essentialistic" view of a device, the contenders would be disposed to see the similarities between the two inventions as deriving from appropriations-a perception that might then dispose them to see the contender as unethical and therefore undeserving of being treated politely.
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The impoliteness stemming from believing that there was only one truth was made worse by a commitment to comprehensive philosophical and cosmological systems (mostly Aristotle's and Descartes's), as they predisposed people to take dogmatic stances by turning their assumptions into unproblematic axioms.25 As Joseph Glanvill put it in his 1665 Scepsis Scientifica (a book he dedicated to the Royal Society), "The Dogmatist gives the lye to all dissenting apprehenders, and proclaims his judgement fittest, to be the Intellectual Standard."26 Glanvill's perception of the dangers of dogmatism was shared by most proponents of scientific institutions and informed the (somewhat rhetorical) refrain found in academic literature and correspondence about the contentiousness and impoliteness of Aristotelian syllogistic disputations.27
The tactics pursued by academies to control the many threats to phil- 
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Mario Biagioli Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century osophical civility focused on two distinct but interrelated problems: how to maintain constructive interaction among practitioners within the academies and the emerging republic of letters, and how to preserve princely support and legitimation of those academies. While both goals were crucial to creating the possibility for legitimate knowledge, they were given different priorities in different contexts depending on institutional settings and degrees of princely involvement in the academies. Responses to the first concern included not only rejecting dogmatic philosophical systems but also proposing less contentious methodologies. Samuel Sorbiere, the secretary of the Montmor academy and a proponent of the Academie Royale des Sciences, put forward a nominalist epistemology justifying how different opinions could be legitimately held about the same phenomenon.28 Boyle's articulation of experimental philosophy in England (and its partial adoption by the Royal Society) also reflected an attempt to introduce protocols of argumentation and a related notion of evidence (the "matter of fact") that would allow practitioners to negotiate their different views in a polite manner.29 While not all academies subscribed to Boyle's comprehensive proposal, the "politeness potential" of experimental practices (or more generally of arguments based on local rather than system-laden evidence) was explicitly recognized throughout Europe.30 A focus on experimentally produced evidence facilitated the closure of debates not only because it helped avoid potentially dogmatic system-laden arguments but also because it allowed critics to ask a range of questions about the production of that evidence before questioning the author's personal integrity. Then, if the differences remained unresolved, the claimant could still be given the benefit of the doubt about the experimental conditions, the details of the apparatus, its calibration, and so on. For instance, Hooke in his 1665 Micrographia (a book sponsored by and dedicated to the Royal Society) avoided giving the "lie" to an author whose observations he questioned by stressing the difficulties involved in the proper setting of the microscope: " princes' honor by avoiding discourses that might endanger the legitimacy of political absolutism. The routine exclusion of politics and theology from the list of acceptable subjects of scientific academies reflected this concern.32 Federico Cesi, founder of the Accademia dei Lincei (a body to which Galileo belonged) claimed that his academy's statutes were "all rooted in Politics and Reason of State."33 While other academies did not explicitly put reason of state at the center of their concerns, they shared the Lincei's cautious demarcation of their fields of inquiry and of the kinds of questions one could ask about nature. Although the exclusion of politics and theology was directly aimed at respecting the authority of princes and churches and, in some countries, at avoiding fueling religious tensions, it was justified philosophically in statements that both "mysteries of religion" and "mysteries of state" were beyond human understanding and that, therefore, their pursuit was not just dangerous and impious, but also hopeless. The legitimacy of the power of the absolute prince (and the discourse of reason of state that went with it) was presented as something as opaque as the nature of God, to which it was usually linked by the doctrines of divine rights of kings. These political and religious axioms were, at the same time, unquestionable facts and impenetrable mysteries.34 For instance, Theophraste Renaudot, the con- The stance against inquiries into the mysteries of religion and state mirrored the academies' bans on metaphysics, comprehensive philosophical systems, and on the search for the final causes of natural phenomena. As Roberval put it during a discussion on the nature of weight at the Academie Royale des Sciences, "one should not ... pronounce on such mysteries. Their roots are completely impenetrable, and to cast light on them we would need a special intellectual ability which we lack."36 Scientists were supposed to describe phenomena and discuss their proximate causes but, like princely subjects who were not allowed to probe the mysteries of reason of state, they did not seek final causes. In short, the limits scientific academies imposed on their inquiries mirrored the similarly cautious boundaries the neostoic philosophers of the period drew around their political analyses.37 The instrumentalist orientation of the subjects of absolute rulers that disposed them against probing allegedly metaphysical mysteries was, I think, a disciplined subjectivity that reflected the regime of power of absolutism and of related doctrines of reason of state of which those mysteries were constitutive.38 good and utility often supersede those of the interests of the individual subject"), and Daniel de Priezac's 1652 Discours politiques stated that the legitimacy of reason of state derives from the fact that the prince perceives things "par une raison universelle que les sujets ne connaissent pas" ("according to a universal reason that the subjects do not grasp") ( 38. Interestingly, probability theory emerged under political absolutism, and Pascal's elaboration of that theory was directly connected to his reflections in the Pensees on truth and justice as they related to the power and function of the absolute prince; see Matthew To summarize, at the time the first academies were being established, the republic of letters was a quite porous configuration of differently powerful patrons and differently polite practitioners. The participants' different interests, backgrounds, and methodologies ensured that civility was, as we say today, a contested category. At the same time, civility could not be overlooked without endangering the sociability of the emerging republic of letters, the legitimation of claims about nature, the distribution of credit and distinction and, more generally, the social structures within which natural philosophers were trying to create their communities and networks. While in the long run the sociabilities of the republic of letters and court society diverged, I believe that the conditions of possibility of scientific etiquette remained framed by the processes through which authority and subjectivity were constructed within court society.
Etiquette, or How to Insulate Honor and Make It Work
Aristocratic and court cultures were characterized by great worries about etiquette violations and sensitivity about honor, status, and relative rank. Men could get into duels over their seating order at court events, and bitter disputes could emerge around perceived misuses of honorific titles. This resulted not simply from inflated, hypersensitive egos but also from the inherent opaqueness and contestability of categories of identity, honor, and status.
Early modern debates on the nature of nobility indicate that definitions of honor or virtue could only be operational; one could not determine exactly what the essence of honor was but only how honor could be gained or lost. Baldassare Castiglione's Book of the Courtier, for example, argued that sprezzatura (that which characterized the perfect courtier) was a natural gift, a form of bodily knowledge that could not be spelled out in words.39 Similar views continued to be expressed more than a century later by Antoine de Courtin in his classic, The Rules of Civility: the bonne Grace, or the neat and becoming air; which is as it were natural to some persons, who by a particular bounty of Nature, have a way of pleasing in what ever they do, and displeasing nobody. Precepts for the acquisition of this Air, and agreeableness, are not to be given, it being a peculiar gift (expressed in this sentence (Gaudeant benenati) which Nature reserves to her self, and is almost the only thing which Art cannot imitate. [RC, p. 3]
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The unspeakability of that which constituted a "person of quality" indicates that identity was not a stable category but depended on how one was able to perform his or her own status and on how that display was confirmed or contested by the surrounding community-a community that needed to be very local as status symbols did not travel well. Because attire, demeanor, and access to and position within privileged court spaces were all body-dependent features, the construction and maintenance of one's status and identity was rooted in continuous ritualized physical interactions within a relatively small and highly interconnected community-court society itself.40 However, what looked like a polite display was a hostile game that tied everyone to everyone else in an attempt, on everyone's part, to distinguish themselves from the rest and yet remain part of that society.41 In this sense, princes and subjects were inherently tied to each other within a framework of tense interdependence that had the prince as its focal point.
Social distinction meant not just power but personhood itself. Elias has argued that individuality was not opposed to society but that the experience of oneself as a distinct individual resulted from a subjectivity constituted by peer-recognition of one's social distinction-a subjectivity one developed precisely by being enmeshed in a tightly interconnected social figuration.42 Therefore, the prince was the most "individualized" and distinct member of court society because, being the node of the most important network of social recognition in that domain, his uniqueness was reluctantly recognized by all the other courtiers. Etiquette was the system of rituals through which that recognition was daily choreographed.
Honor and distinction were inherently linked. To have honor meant to be a noteworthy individual placed high on the social scale, that is, to be different from those placed below. It meant being different in ways that made a difference. Louis Marin has argued that signs of distinction (like expensive attire) signified power because they meant that one had the control over the people whose labor had produced those signs.43 Individuality was constituted by wearing inscriptions that showed one had subjects from whom one differentiated oneself. Consequently, the prince's body, gestures, and actions needed to convey marks of distinction that represented him as the most distinct and therefore most powerful person-a unique individual entitled to power over his subjects. Common signs would have ruined the prince's "absolute individuality." Honor, therefore, was not only an opaque and contestable category, but it was as fragile as it was great. To Castiglione, the fragility of honor 40 it is far less unbecoming for one of low birth to fail to do virtuous things than for one of noble birth, who, should he stray from the path of his forebears, stains the family name, and not only fails to achieve anything but loses what has been achieved already. For noble birth is like a bright lamp that makes manifest and visible deeds both good and bad, kindling and spurring on to virtue as much for fear of dishonor as for hope of praise.44
The apparently paradoxical symbiosis between power and fragility may be easily explained. Signs of princely power had to be fragile in order to convey the uniqueness of the prince-a uniqueness that, in turn, legitimized his power. Consequently, their reading was inherently unstable, an instability that was further enhanced by the fact that the readers of these signs were the people from whom the ruler was trying to differentiate him or herself while making them subjects. At the same time, as shown by Louis XIV, the prince's material resources helped him stabilize the reading of these fragile signs of power by disciplining rebellious aristocrats into reading them "correctly" and accepting his self-representation as somebody who had legitimate access to those resources. Authority was both produced by and necessary to the management of fragile signs of distinction. The tense relationship between power, honor, and distinction explains the princes' and aristocrats' extreme sensitivity to insults and their reliance on etiquette as a means to control such occurrences. While commoners might overlook slightly inappropriate gestures and expressions or marginal violations of established rituals, princes were strongly predisposed to read them as insults and, sometimes, even as instances of lesemajeste.45 As we will see, the princes' fundamental sensitivity to insults can be traced, mutatis mutandis, to their caution about associating themselves with possibly controversial or problematic claims about nature.
I find it useful to think metaphorically of honor as electricity. Such a metaphor helps us visualize the predicament of a scientific practitioner (or any member of court society) whose discourse was framed by that of the prince's honor and authority. The more electric power you have, the more things you can do with it, but by the same means you are also at higher risk of devastating short circuits.46 To make great honor work, one needed to insulate it properly and make it flow through carefully crafted In principle, a short circuit had the potential to undermine not only the prince but also the entire system of legitimation of claims, identities, and social hierarchies that rested on the prince's authority-that extraordinarily effective bluff staged by mutually dependent princes and subjects that, eventually, was collectively called during the French Revolution. Princely power maintained its legitimacy insofar as its roots were insulated by being presented as a mystery not to be questioned but simply believed. As with related categories such as honor, virtue, nobility, or sprezzatura, princely authority remained legitimate only by being presented as opaque and beyond verbalization and probing. To function as the roots of ancien regime society, these categories were represented as a form of tacit knowledge.
Frameworks of Interdependence and Sociability
Let me jump ahead of my story to give an example (which I will expand later) of how the processes that underlay these courtly scenarios of tense interdependence, fragile marks of distinction, and construction of princely authority through a hostile collusion of princes and subjects also framed the sociability and distribution of professional distinction within early prince-supported academies. Paradoxically, it was the Royal Society-the academy that, retrospectively, seems to best approximate a prince-independent corporation of natural philosophers-that constituted its authority in the republic of letters most like a king within his court.
The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society was a fundamental 47 . See Elias, The Court Society, pp. 137-38. 48. Throughout this essay I employ two topoi to discuss the construction of authority: electricity and capital. While my use of electricity is completely metaphorical, that of capital is less so because, following Pierre Bourdieu, I include in this category marks of distinction that are not directly reducible to cash value. While I tend to use these two different topoi to analyze different issues, I do not see them as unrelated. Rather, through the metaphor of electricity I try to visualize the instability of the processes through which credit, authority, and capital are constituted. However, although electricity is valuable for discussing some dimensions of power, I am also aware that it is not a pliable enough metaphor to represent the ways the nature of power and authority changed in the period and environments discussed in this essay.
Winter 1996 209 resource for the credibility of the Royal Society as a corporation-a resource that allowed it to give credit to its members and correspondents.49 But if the Transactions gave credit to those who published there, it did so by recycling credit. The Royal Society was not naturally endowed with authority but became a central node of the republic of letters by enticing its "subjects" to "submit" their work (as gifts) to its journal.50 It was this scientific sovereignty that the Transactions was then able to bestow back as credibility onto its contributors.51 To use a different analogy, the Royal Society acted like a bank that gave out credit precisely because there were enough authors who were giving (depositing or contributing) their papers (Bourdieu might say their cultural capital) to the Transactions. While both the prince and the Royal Society displayed and were credited with authority, such authority rested on the subjects' trading their recognition of such authority for a distinct place in those social figurations that could not operate without nodes recycling those gifts of submission into marks of social or professional distinction.52
If the Royal Society, like a prince who needed many subjects to be powerful himself, sought contributions to the Transactions and exchanges with foreign correspondents, its distribution of credit and priority among the correspondents and members created tensions and conflicts analogous to those caused by the king's granting privileges to some of his subjects but not to others. 
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Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century tion) among its subjects while maintaining the integrity of that figuration so as to avoid its own loss of authority that might have resulted from some of its contributors' losing face and honor.54 The stabilization of scientific claims was as tricky as that of courtly signs of distinction. Therefore, the legitimation of one's claims and status as a credible author was predicated on the fragile stability of a dense network of natural philosophers whose contributions constituted the Royal Society as a center of authority.55 While, retrospectively, we might be tempted to place the contributors to the Transactions in the category of modern scientific authors rather than of princely subjects, they were simply a different kind of subject-subjects not of a prince or within a specific court or country but of an interdependent figuration spread over different countries. The explicit tensions between coexisting local interests and pride and an international outlook show that the Society was caught between two inherently linked and conflicting needs: to strengthen its authority as a nationally situated institution by developing international networks.56
What the Society tried to develop was not increased independence but new modes of dense interdependence that, underneath the obvious morphological differences, still constituted individual distinction through etiquette-based processes of mutual dependency that were structurally analogous to those shaping courtly identities. Unlike an absolute prince who embodied the power of the surrounding social figuration, Oldenburg only helped manage the authority of the network centered on the Royal Society.57 However, he shared in the princely role insofar as he effectively directed the development of the etiquette protocols that structured such a fragile emerging figuration.58 As argued by Rob Iliffe, The transition from a princely patron to a corporation of interdependent practitioners as the primary agent of legitimation was not a linear process. In the seventeenth century, only the Royal Society approximated that format and obtained the legal status of corporation; for several decades it remained the only institution to recognize individual authorship and to publish with its own imprimatur. As we will see, other academies, such as the Accademia del Cimento and the Academie Royale des Sciences, exemplified hybrid frameworks of legitimation and authorship. While to some extent these continental academies addressed the wider international philosophical community, for a few decades the prince (rather than peer recognition) remained their most direct source of legitimation, as in the previous patronage environment. One might say that initially the recognition these savants may have received from the republic of letters did not constitute them as individual authors but tended more to be turned into cultural capital for their princely patrons. By and large, these academicians remained princely subjects, and the great international visibility of some of them (like Huygens or Gian Domenico Cassini) benefited their patron's distinction as much as their own. Consequently, the etiquette of these institutions was primarily concerned with maintaining or shielding the status of their patron rather than with developing and managing a broad community of interdependent practitioners.
If in time scientific academies managed to replace the princes as the central nodes of networks of interdependence and legitimation, this process was neither external nor opposed to the logic of princely power and etiquette but was predicated precisely on the emergence of princesupported academies and on their ability to articulate new figurations and sociabilities within such frameworks. In a sense, the academies were able to use the "seed authority" (as in seed money) provided by the princes to develop networks that would eventually constitute them as "scientific courts" of a new (but equally etiquette-bound) realm: the scientific community.
The In general, the more the production and legitimation of the academicians' claims were represented as dependent on the prince, the more polite (insulated) they tended to be, and the more the practitioners were represented as subjects rather than authors. Symmetrically, a relatively large distance between practitioners and princes or a relatively low princely power allowed the practitioners to represent themselves more as authors than as subjects. However, there were limits to how distant one could get from the prince, as excessive distance would have prevented the legitimation of both the practitioners and their claims. One could not step outside the system altogether, as that would have produced not freedom but the disruption of the conditions of possibility for the new subjectivities the natural philosophers sought to articulate.
Participating Princes, Disappearing Practitioners
The Accademia del Cimento exemplifies the etiquette problems and forms of sociability (and subjectivity) framed by a prince's direct participation in an academy, that is, a scenario in which the practitioners worked with and around the power source.
Between 1657 A prince of his rank could easily taint his image by working together with his subjects (some of whom were of quite low social background) in an official professional context, but such participation could instead be justified by presenting the academy as a sort of sport, that is, an activity in which standard codes of etiquette were greatly relaxed.64 Similar concerns can be found at play behind the public, textual presentation of the academy's work, the 1667 Saggi, where Leopold was presented as a princely supervisor rather than the hands-on participant he often was.65
Similarly, the members of the Cimento were not allowed to display their association with the academy by using titles such as Accademico del Cimento. They could not become academicians, that is, members of an official corporate body, because Leopold's status required them to be, so to speak, his scientific servants-agents of his celebration of Medicean science. Leopold's encomiastic agenda can also be read in the distribution pattern of the Saggi, which was neither sold nor made widely available to members of the republic of letters. Rather, this elegantly illustrated volume celebrating the continuing wealth of Medicean science through a selection of the academy's experiments was usually given out as a sort of 
Critical Inquiry Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century coffee-table book to members of the European princely and aristocratic community.66
The academy committed itself to the experimental method, that is, to the description of experimentally produced effects rather than to the identification of their ultimate causes. If the Saggi included occasional interpretations and hypotheses that went beyond the mere description of experiments, these were not presented as essential components of the text but as devices to ease "the transition from one experiment to another" and were explicitly cast as "the idea or opinion of individual academicians, but never of the Academy, whose sole goal is to experiment and describe."67 This cautious position was not only a result of Leopold's desire to keep clear of possible conflicts like those experienced by Galileo with theologians; it reflected the politeness of the philosophical etiquette to which he was bound by his own status.68 By having his subjects perform and describe experiments rather than seek their causes, Leopold made sure that the activity of the Cimento would not lead to status-tainting disputes-a goal made explicit in the Saggi's prologue, which stated that "above all, we are committed not to ever pick a fight with anyone by entering in subtle disputes or contentious contradictions."69
The care Leopold dedicated to the various replications of Torricelli's experiment on the vacuum and their textual representation in the Saggi bear out his caution most clearly. The existence of the vacuum was a very contentious issue as it went against fundamental assumptions of both Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophy. For instance, Michelangelo Ricci, an etiquette-conscious Roman mathematician who eventually became a cardinal, warned Leopold about the attacks that might have been elicited by the Saggi's discussion of the vacuum-attacks that he perceived as particularly embarrassing because of the prince's explicit patronage of the academy.70 Although sharing Ricci's worries, Leopold wanted to claim the Torricellian (that is, Medicean) priority of this discovery, which had been widely replicated and discussed throughout Europe after the initial experiment in 1643. In the end, he found himself in a difficult position: he could either claim the existence of the vacuum (thus maximizing the Medici's prestige for having patronized such a philosophically important discovery), or make a "softer" claim that would give the Medici both less credit and less trouble. 
See Galluzzi, "L'Accademia del
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Eventually, Leopold's concern with avoiding embarrassing disputes outdid his desire for distinction, and the academy limited itself to reclaiming Torricelli's priority for the experiment but not for the discovery of the vacuum. While the Saggi reported that the Torricellian cylinder displayed a space "empty of air," it admitted that such a space could be filled by something else.7' While the Italian term vuoto means both "empty" and "vacuum," the Saggi made sure to use it as an adjective, not as a noun. Interestingly, the claim that Torricelli had discovered the vacuum was made only in a tract "privately" published by a Medici client, Carlo Dati, who, erring on the side of caution, never mentioned the academy and signed himself as Timauro Antiate.72 However, Leopold's concern with avoiding controversial claims was not shared by all academicians; Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, for example, thought that the prince's caution was preventing the academy from making more relevant contributions. 73 Also, in the Saggi Leopold made sure that the academy's activity was represented as having proceeded as smoothly as possible, undisturbed by internal disputes. The strong tensions and disagreements (sometimes punctuated by colorful insults) recorded in both the academicians' and Leopold's private correspondence were made invisible in the book.74 Moreover, no name of any academician was made explicit. The only voice found in the Saggi is that of the secretary who compiled the volume, whose name, however, was also left unmentioned. Similarly, the "Relation de l'Eclipse Horizontale de Lune observee en l'isle de Gorgone le 16Juin 1666 par l'ordre du Serenissime Prince Leopold," printed in the Journal des Sfavans, mentioned neither the academy as an official body nor the names of any of the academicians sent by the prince to the island and to two other sites in Tuscany.75 By stressing that the expedition originated from the desires (and resources) of the prince, the report presented Leopold as the implicit author. The authorship of the academicians was erased (or "insulated" until it was extinguished) because they were too close to the prince. The Saggi's textual strategies allowed Leopold to efface himself sufficiently from the academy's activities to preserve his princely status and yet not enough to delegitimize the academy's results. Unlike the Royal Society, which committed itself to certifying knowledge by collective witnessing, the Cimento's results were granted credibility simply by virtue 
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Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century issue in 1688 and was formalized only in 1699, that is, after the Academie had become more of an institution.90 Instead, collective authorship was dominant in official publications during the early decades, and Louis's ministers had direct control over the Academie's official publications "to preserve the purity of the company's reputation."91 Unlike the Royal Society, the Academie could not publish with its own imprimatur. While the academicians had access to less official (or foreign) venues of publication, the format of these communications also reflected tensions around the issue of authorship.92 For instance, while short reports of the Academie's work (usually a few pages long) were published in theJournal des Sfavans, they tended to be reviews rather than official papers. Curiously, these reviews did not refer to the Academie Royale des Sciences as an official body but limited themselves to saying that the work was done or shown at the king's library by an "assemblee" that met there.93 Then, at first, While some of these articles were based on letters to the editor, most of them tended to be either summaries (probably supplied by academicians) or reviews of pamphlets (probably a few pages long) that had been printed "Chez Frederic Leonard." Leonard was an "Imprimeur ordinaire du Roy," that is, someone authorized to print for the king material that could not be handled by the official printing house, the Imprimerie Royale. The choice of printer and the format of the printing (quarto, rather Winter 1996 when academicians sent letters to the Journal des Sfavans, they were printed without presenting the authors as members of the Academie.94 This effacement of official status becomes more striking once we realize that Abbe Jean Gallois, an academician since 1668, had been put in charge of the Journal des Sfavans by Colbert and that, therefore, it could have been practically feasible for the publication to become the Academie's official link to the republic of letters.95 That this was not the case suggests that, unsurprisingly, princely caution overrode the academicians' desire for individual credit and professional distinction.
As with the Cimento, during the Academie's informal period the king directly shared the credit for the work of his "agents." This was particularly evident in the 1686 medal celebrating Cassini's discovery of new satellites of Saturn. Nowhere on the medal is Cassini's name to be found, as the motto is limited to "V.SATURNI SATELLITES PRIMUM COG-NITI." The erasure of Cassini's name was not a sign of royal unfairness but rather of Louis's noblesse oblige toward him. As with the Cimento, a direct affiliation with the prince might have caused the subject's authorial effacement. It is telling that Cassini's discoveries were not quite represented as contributing to Louis's glory. Rather, the medal's description suggests that it was Louis who-by having that medal struck-was honoring the discovery by allowing it to be recorded "among the events of the reign of His Majesty."96
The limited authorship granted to the members of the Academie than the folio used for the Academie's early official publications) indicate that although these short pamphlets (which I have not been able to locate) were not published incognito, they were given a much less official status (consonant with the unofficial picture they presented of the Academie and of its members). Probably they were meant for a Parisian market-allowing the king and the academicians to receive some credit for their works and patronage without exposing them to the risk connected to an official publication. Unlike the Cimento, which stopped convening only ten years after its inception, the Academie's continuity enabled it to slowly become more of an institution, that is, a more interdependent figuration of practitioners-a path marked, in 1699, by the development of statutes and protocols regulating its internal activity. The members of the Cimento were never able (nor did they have the time) to achieve that format, as Leopold remained too close and too involved. The Academie's move toward self-regulation was parallel to its becoming more of a node in the republic of letters. If, in the beginning, its status had rested on the prince's, by 1699 it had produced a number of texts, had published official reports of its activities (though only for two years in 1692-93), and was developing its networks of correspondence with savants in other countries. In retrospect, the initial relative isolation of the Academie from the republic of letters appears not just as an obstacle but also a productive trial period. In fact, unlike England where the codes of civility did not conflict explicitly with the sociability of experimental philosophy, in France we see that the dominant conversation-based civility tended to clash with more technical or experimental approaches to natural philosophy. These tensions between experimentalists and conversationalists had become particularly intractable within the Montmor academy.104 Therefore, the early isolation of the Academie Royale des Sciences from the wider polite society may have allowed the king to keep his potentially impolite academicians safely in the "attic," while de facto providing them with a shielded (and yet legitimate) social space in which to articulate the more professional and experiment-oriented practices they were able to adopt publicly in 1699.105 By that time, the Academie could state the difference between its protocols and the conversational civility characteristic of earlier private philosophical academies. As Abbe Jean-Paul Bignon, the president of the Academie, put it during its first public meeting: "it is enough that this truth is useful, 
Scientific Academies in the Seventeenth Century that surrounded it. Martin Lister, a member of the Royal Society, recalled that the Marquis de LHopital-an academician whom he had met in Paris in 1698-told him that "it was not possible for them to continue the Monthly Memoirs, as they had done for two years only, because they were but very few in number of that Society, and had very little correspondence" (JP, p. 95). To this situation Lister opposed the predicament of the late Oldenburg, who had been able to manage the Society's vast correspondence network for the very reason that it was so vast. As Oldenburg told Lister, his trick was to make "one Letter answer another" (JP, p. 78). The Philosophical Transactions was a self-sustaining chain reaction (of publication and credit), which Oldenburg needed only to moderate. In general, the Cimento and the Academie tended to efface individual authorship and remained both internally unstructured and relatively isolated from the republic of letters-an insulation that was directly proportional to the princes' stakes in their academies. Open communication with the outside remained limited (at least initially) both because it was not crucial to the legitimation of the academies' work (which was mostly rooted in the status of their princes) and because, being directly connected to a prince, the academies' protocols of external communication (like any form of diplomatic interaction) were constrained by princely etiquette ( fig. 1).107 On the other hand, a greater relative distance between the academy and the prince (as in the case of the Royal Society) allowed not only for the recognition of individual authorship but-the prince's role in the legitimation of the academicians' work being less crucial-it effectively allowed the academicians to articulate institutional protocols so that they could legitimize their work more through their own interdependence rather than through their dependence on the prince.108 The develop- Sorbiere was also struck by the peculiar nature of the English monarchy and remarked that "as the Court of England is not so great as ours, there is the easier Access to the Prince" and that "the King must maintain a good report with the Nobility and Gentry, in order to preserve their Affection and Esteem, these last are also obliged to use the same Practice toward merchants"-a scenario that differed sharply from the French (V, p. 50; RV, pp. 93, 94). Being a good subject of an absolute ruler, Sorbiere was also puzzled by the political role of the English Parliament, whichprobably to the dismay of his hosts-he called a "bizarre body."117 According to him, the English had a somewhat "wild" temperament-something that reminded him of the Romans who, like the English, indulged in violent sports-and such a temperament made them unable to accept stronger forms of government."18 Sorbiere's perceptions 116. Then, when it seemed that Charles might visit the Society, the fellows planned an event that would have resembled Louis's ceremonial visit to the Academie in 1681. Like Louis, who did not participate in the knowledge-making process but observed only unproblematic and well-debugged demonstrations, Charles was not to witness experiments but to enjoy a show, as indicated by the council minutes, which described the event in terms of the "King's Entertainment." Then, to avoid embarrassments to the royal guest and his academy, the council "ordered that Mr. Hook and the Operator take care so to prepare the Compressing-Engin, that it may not fail in the trying of Experiments therein" (CB, 6 July 1663, 1:18; emphasis added).
117. "Corps bigearre" (RV, p. 100). This passage was not included in the English edition.
118. Commenting on the weakness of the English monarchy, Sorbiere remarked that "the Genius of the English does require they should be governed after this gentle manner" (V, p. 50; RV, p. 94). Also, they are fond enough of a King, for the greater Glory of their Country; they love the Title, and prefer Regal Government before any other. But they own their over-free
